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11 Introduction
An important issue in cooperative game theory is the allocation of the value
of the grand coalition of a game to the players of this game. To this aim
various solution concepts have been developed. They can be categorized in
one point solution concepts, e.g. the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)), the
nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) and the compromise value (Tijs (1981)), and
set-valued solutions concepts, e.g. the core (Gillies (1953)), the core cover
(Tijs and Lipperts (1982)) and the Weber set (Weber (1988)). The core is
contained in the Weber set and the core cover. Furthermore, the nucleolus
is an element of the core. It is established that a game is convex (Shapley
(1971), Ichiishi (1981)) if and only if the Weber set coincides with the core.
In this paper the class of games for which the core coincides with the
core cover (compromise stable games) is characterized. This class contains
the class of bankruptcy games (Curiel, Maschler, and Tijs (1988)) and clan
games (Potters, Poos, Muto, and Tijs (1989)). Moreover an easy explicit
formula for the nucleolus for this class of games is developed, using an ap-
proach based on bankruptcy problems. As an application an easy proof
of the formula for the nucleolus of clan games as derived by Potters et al.
(1989) is provided. Furthermore the class of convex and compromise stable
games is characterized. Finally, the relation between the core cover and
the Weber set is studied. It is proved that under a weak condition their
intersection is nonempty.
In section 2 we summarize some main known facts on the core cover.
Section 3 deals with the characterization of the class of compromise stable
games. Section 4 derives an explicit formula for the nucleolus for compromise
stable games and discusses an application to clan games. The ﬁnal section
studies the relation between the core cover and the Weber set.
2 Core cover
This section reviews some general notions dealing with the core cover of
transferable utility games. A transferable utility game (TU-game) consists
of a pair (N;v), in which N is a ﬁnite set of players and v : 2N ! R is
a function assigning to each coalition S 2 2N a payoﬀ v(S). By deﬁnition
v(;) = 0. The set of all transferable utility games with player set N is
denoted by TUN.
2The core C(v) of a game v 2 TUN is given by:
C(v) =
n






xi ¸ v(S); 8S 2 2Nnf;g
o
:
The core of a game consists of those payoﬀ vectors such that no coalition
has an incentive to split oﬀ. The core of a game might be empty.
The utopia vector M(v) of v 2 TUN consists of the utopia demands
of all players. The utopia demand of player i 2 N is given by:
Mi(v) = v(N) ¡ v(Nnfig):
The minimum right mi(v) of player i corresponds to the minimum value
this player can achieve by satisfying all other players in a coalition by giving










The core cover CC(v) consists of all eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors, giving each
player at least his minimum right, but no more than his utopia demand:
CC(v) =
n
x 2 RN j
X
i2N
xi = v(N); m(v) · x · M(v)
o
:
The elements of the core cover can be interpreted as possible allocations
of the value of the grand coalition and can be seen as compromise values
between m(v) and M(v). Note that the core cover of a game can be empty.
A game v 2 TUN is said to be compromise admissible if:
m(v) · M(v) and
X
i2N




Clearly the core cover of v is non-empty if and only if v is compromise
admissible. The class of all compromise admissible games with player set N
is denoted by CAN. The following result about the core and the core cover
is well known:
Proposition 2.1 (Tijs and Lipperts (1982)) Let v 2 TUN, then C(v) ½
CC(v).
The extreme points of the core cover can be described by larginal vectors.
The concept of larginals is also used in Gonz´ alez D´ ıaz, Borm, Hendrickx,
3and Quant (2003) and in Quant, Borm, Hendrickx, and Zwikker (2004). The
ﬁrst paper uses larginal vectors to give an alternative characterization of
the compromise value. The latter paper studies the average of all larginals
as a one point solution concept. An order of N is a bijective function
¾ : f1;:::;jNjg ! N. The player at position k in the order ¾ is denoted
by ¾(k). The set of all orders of N is denoted by Π(N). For ¾ 2 Π(N) the
larginal l¾(v) is the eﬃcient payoﬀ vector giving the ﬁrst players in ¾ their
utopia demands as long as it is still possible to satisfy the remaining players
with at least their minimum rights.
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for every k 2 f1;:::;jNjg.
It is easily seen that the core cover equals the convex hull of all larginals:
CC(v) = conv
©
l¾(v) j ¾ 2 Π(N)
ª
:
The ﬁrst player with respect to ¾ who does not receive his utopia payoﬀ
is called the pivot of l¾(v). In case every player gets his utopia payoﬀ, we
deﬁne the pivot to be the last player. Note that each larginal vector contains
exactly one pivot. The following example illustrates the notion of larginal
vectors and pivots.
Example 2.1 Let v 2 CAN be the game deﬁned by:
S 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 N
v(S) 1 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 7 4 6 8 10
Then M(v) = (2;4;6;3) and m(v) = (1;0;1;0), so v 2 CAN. For ¾ =
(1234), l¾(v) equals (2;4;4;0) and player 3 is the pivot. If ¾ = (3421), the
4corresponding larginal equals l¾(v) = (1;0;6;3) and player 2 is the pivot.
The core cover of v is described by:
CC(v) = conv
©








3 Core and core cover
In this section we characterize the class of compromise stable games, i.e. the
class of games for which the core cover coincides with the core. Furthermore
we characterize the class of convex compromise stable games.
We are interested in the class of compromise stable games. For example
bankruptcy games and clan games (the precise deﬁnitions are provided later
on) are compromise stable games.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A game v 2 CAN is compromise stable if C(v) = CC(v).
The following theorem characterizes the class of compromise stable games.
Theorem 3.1 Let v 2 CAN. Then v is compromise stable if and only if










Proof: Let v 2 CAN. First suppose that C(v) = CC(v). Then for all
¾ 2 Π(N), l¾(v) 2 C(v). Let S 2 2Nnf;g. We show that (1) is satisﬁed.
Let ¾ 2 Π(N) begin with all players of NnS and end with the players of S.
Hence for k 2 f1;:::;jNnSjg, ¾(k) 2 NnS. Let l¾(v) be the larginal vector
corresponding to ¾. There are two possibilities:
² The pivot of l¾(v) is an element of NnS. In this case each player of S









² The pivot of l¾(v) is an element of S. This implies that each player in























Conversely, assume that inequality (1) is satisﬁed for each S 2 2Nnf;g.
By convexity of the core it suﬃces to show that for each order ¾ 2 Π(N),
























The core condition concerning coalition S is satisﬁed. Hence, l¾(v) is an
element of C(v). ¤
A game v 2 TUN is convex if for all i 2 N and all S ½ T ½ Nnfig:
v(S [ fig) ¡ v(S) · v(T [ fig) ¡ v(T):
For convex games the marginal contribution of a player increases if this
player joins a larger coalition. If v 2 TUN is convex, it is easily veriﬁed that
mi(v) = v(fig) for all i 2 N.
In the following we focus on games which are both convex and compro-
mise stable. A well-known class of games satisfying both convexity and com-
promise stability is the class of bankruptcy games (O’Neill (1982)). These
games arise from so-called bankruptcy situations. Bankruptcy situations
are formalized by a pair (E;d). Here E ¸ 0 is the estate which has to be
divided among the claimants in N and d 2 RN, d ¸ 0 is a vector of claims.
By the nature of a bankruptcy problem E ·
P
i2N di.
One can associate a bankruptcy game vE;d 2 TUN to a bankruptcy
problem (E;d). The value of a coalition S is determined by the amount of









A game v 2 TUN is additive if there exists a vector a 2 RN such that
v(S) =
P
i2S ai for all S 2 2N. The game v is then denoted by a. A game
v 2 TUN is strategically equivalent to w 2 TUN if there exist a positive
real number k and an additive game a 2 TUN such that w = a + kv.
The next theorem states that bankruptcy games are essentially the only
games that are both convex and compromise stable.
6Theorem 3.2 A game v 2 TUN is both convex and compromise stable if
and only if v is strategically equivalent to a bankruptcy game.
Proof: Let v 2 TUN be a convex compromise stable game. Deﬁne
ai = v(fig) = mi(v) (the last equality is satisﬁed because v is convex) and
w(S) = v(S) ¡
P
i2S ai for all S 2 2N. Then w 2 TUN is convex and
compromise stable. Furthermore mi(w) = w(fig) = 0 for all i 2 N and
C(w) = CC(w). Furthermore:
M(w) = M(v) ¡ m(v) and m(w) = 0:
We show that w is the bankruptcy game vE;d with E = w(N) and d = M(w).

















Theorem 3.1 implies w(S) · vE;d(S) for all S ½ N. Now suppose there is





i2S mi(w) and hence:
w(S) < E ¡
X
i2NnS




Consider ¾ 2 Π(N) that begins with the players of S and ends with the
players of NnS, i.e. ¾(k) 2 S for k 2 f1;:::;jSjg. The payoﬀ of coalition








This implies that m¾(w) 62 CC(w). This contradicts CC(w) = C(w).
The converse is also true because bankruptcy games are convex games
and the core of a bankruptcy game coincides with the core cover (cf. Curiel
et al. (1988)). ¤
It is trivial to show that for any 3-player TU-game the core cover equals
the core. From Theorem 3.2 it then follows that each convex three player
game is strategically equivalent to a bankruptcy game.
74 The nucleolus of compromise stable games
This section analyzes the nucleolus of compromise stable games: it develops
a formula which is based on the Talmud rule for bankruptcy problems.
Let (E;d) be a bankruptcy problem. The constrained equal award
rule (CEA) is for all i 2 N deﬁned by
CEAi(E;d) = minf®;dig;
with ® such that
P
i2N minf®;dig = E. The Talmud rule (TAL) (cf.



















for all i 2 N. Aumann and Maschler (1985) prove that the Talmud rule
equals the nucleolus (cf. Schmeidler (1969)) of the corresponding bankruptcy
game. The nucleolus of a game1 v 2 TUN is denoted by º(v). For our
results we do not need the exact deﬁnition of the nucleolus, but we only use
the following important result.
Theorem 4.1 (Potters and Tijs (1994)) Let v;w 2 TUN be such that
v is convex and C(v) = C(w). Then º(v) = º(w).
The following theorem shows that the nucleolus for compromise stable games
can be computed by ﬁrst giving every player his minimum right and then
adding the value of the Talmud rule of a bankruptcy problem derived from
the corresponding game.
Theorem 4.2 Let v 2 CAN be compromise stable. Then








Proof: Let v 2 CAN be compromise stable. Deﬁne the additive game
a 2 TUN by taking ai = mi(v) for all i 2 N, and deﬁne w 2 TUN as
w(S) = v(S) ¡
P
i2S ai, S 2 2N. Because the nucleolus is relative invariant
with respect to strategic equivalence we have
º(v) = a + º(w) = m(v) + º(w):
1In fact, the game should have a non-empty imputation set.
8For w the following assertions can easily be veriﬁed M(w) = M(v) ¡ m(v),
m(w) = 0, w(N) = v(N) ¡
P
i2N mi(v), and C(w) = CC(w).
Consider the bankruptcy problem deﬁned by E = w(N) and d = M(w).
For the corresponding bankruptcy game vE;d it is true that vE;d(N) = w(N).
By deﬁnition of vE;d, Mi(vE;d) = minfE;dig, and using the convexity of vE;d,

















The last equality follows from the fact that mi(w) = 0, and mi(w) ¸ w(N)¡ P




x 2 RN j
X
i2N
















x 2 RN j
X
i2N
xi = w(N); 0 · x · M(w)
o
= CC(w) = C(w):
Since vE;d and w have the same core, and vE;d is convex, we can apply
Theorem 4.1. Hence,

















º(v) = m(v) + º(w)








Corollary 4.1 Let v be a 3-player game with a non-empty core. Then








9Example 4.1 Consider the game of Example 2.1. Then M(v) = (2;4;6;3)
and m(v) = (1;0;1;0). For every coalition S inequality (1) is valid. For
example v(f1;2g) · m1(v)+m2(v) and v(f2;3g) · v(N)¡M1(v)¡M4(v).
Applying Theorem 3.1 we ﬁnd C(v) = CC(v). Using Theorem 4.2, the
nucleolus of v is given by:



























We now consider the application of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.2 with
respect to clan games. In a clan game a coalition can not make any proﬁt
if a certain group (CLAN) is not part of this coalition. A game v 2 TUN is
a clan game if v(S) ¸ 0 for all S 2 2N, Mi(v) ¸ 0 for all i 2 N and if there
exists a nonempty coalition CLAN ½ N such that:
(i) v(S) = 0 if CLAN 6½ S
(ii) v(N) ¡ v(S) ¸
P
i2NnS Mi(v), for all S with CLAN ½ S.
The last property is also known as the union property. Clan games for which
CLAN = fi¤g are also known as big boss games.2 In the following corollary
several (known) properties of clan games are easily proved with the aid of
Theorems 3.1 and 4.2.
Corollary 4.2 (cf. Potters et al. (1989)) Let v 2 TUN be a clan game







Proof: Let v 2 TUN be a clan game, with jCLANj ¸ 2. Then Mi(v) = v(N)
if i 2 CLAN. Let i 2 N and S ½ N such that i 2 S. If CLAN ½ S it can








2This deﬁnition diﬀers from the deﬁnition of big boss games given in Muto et al. (1988)
in the sense that it is now required that v(S) ¸ 0 for all S 2 2
N and the requirement of
monotonicity is weakened to M(v) ¸ 0. A game v 2 TU
N is monotonic, if v(S) · v(T) if
S ½ T.
10The last inequality follows from M(v) ¸ 0. Since v(S) = 0 if CLAN 6½ S, it
follows that (by taking S = fig) mi(v) = 0 for all i 2 N. Therefore m(v) ·





i2N Mi(v). Hence v 2 CAN.
Let S 2 2Nnf;g. If CLAN ½ S, then (1) is satisﬁed by condition (ii). If
CLAN 6½ S, then v(S) = 0 and formula (1) follows from m(v) = 0. Theorem
3.1 yields C(v) = CC(v). Since jCLANj ¸ 2, we have that
P
i2N Mi(v) ¸








Note that the results of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.2 can also be used to
reprove the following corollary in a relatively straightforward way.
Corollary 4.3 (cf. Muto et al. (1988)) Let v 2 TUN be a clan game
with CLAN = fi¤g. Then v 2 CAN, C(v) = CC(v), and
ºj(v) =
½ 1




k2Nnfi¤g Mk(v) if j = i¤:
The following Venn diagram summarizes the relations between the dif-






Figure 1: A Venn diagram depicting the relations between several classes of
games (up to strategic equivalence).
115 Core cover and Weber set
This section studies the relation between the core cover and the Weber set.
For ¾ 2 Π(N) the corresponding marginal vector m¾(v) measures the










; i 2 f1;:::;ng:
The Weber set is the convex hull of all marginal vectors:
W(v) = convfm¾(v) j ¾ 2 Π(N)g:
An important relation between core and Weber set is given in the following
proposition:
Proposition 5.1 (Weber (1988)) Let v 2 TUN. Then C(v) ½ W(v).
Moreover,
Proposition 5.2 (Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981)) Let v 2 TUN.
Then v is convex if and only if C(v) = W(v).
For any TU-game the intersection of the core cover and the Weber set always
contains the core. Hence, the core cover and the Weber set have points in
common if the core is non-empty. This raises the question whether the
intersection of the core cover and the Weber set is non-empty in general for
compromise admissible games. It is showed that under a weak condition the
answer is aﬃrmative. For the proof of this theorem the following lemma is
needed:
Lemma 5.1 If n 2 N and d;y 2 Rn with:
y1 ¸ ::: ¸ yn; (3)
k X
i=1




di = 0; (5)
then,




12Proof: The proof is given by an induction argument to n. For n = 1
the assertion is true, since d1 = 0. Assume that the lemma is satisﬁed for











diyi + (dn¡1 + dn)yn¡1) + dn(yn ¡ yn¡1)
· 0 + dn(yn ¡ yn¡1) · 0:
The ﬁrst inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and the second
inequality follows from the fact that dn ¸ 0 and yn ¡ yn¡1 · 0. ¤




mj(v) · v(N): (6)
Then CC(v) \ W(v) 6= ;.
Proof: Let v 2 CAN be such that for all S 2 2N (6) is satisﬁed. Suppose
that CC(v)\W(v) = ;. Since CC(v) and W(v) are both closed and convex
sets we can separate these sets with a hyperplane. This means that there
exists a vector y 2 RN such that:
m ¢ y > l ¢ y for all m 2 W(v), l 2 CC(v): (7)
Let ¾ 2 Π(N) an order such that y¾(1) ¸ y¾(2) ¸ ::: ¸ y¾(n). Consider l¾(v)
and m¾(v). Then:










Now we ﬁrst derive some inequalities with respect to v(S). Because v is
compromise admissible and hence m(v) · M(v), it is true that for all i 2 N












= mi(v) · Mi(v):





From (6) it follows that:




Deﬁne d¾(k) = m¾
¾(k)(v) ¡ l¾













































Hence m¾(v) ¢ y · l¾(v) ¢ y. This contradicts (7). ¤
The following example shows that it is possible that the core cover and the
Weber set do not have any points in common.
Example 5.1 Let v 2 TUN and N = f1;:::;5g. Let v be such that the
players 1, 2 and 3 are symmetric and so are players 4 and 5. To simplify
notations we say that the players 1, 2 and 3 are of type a and 4 and 5 of type
b. For example the coalition fabbg represents the coalitions f145g, f245g or
f345g. The game v is given by:
S a b aa ab bb aaa aab abb aaab aabb N
v(S) 0 0 ¡1 0 2 ¡1 ¡1 2 ¡1 1 1
14It is easily veriﬁed that M(v) = (0;0;0;2;2) and m(v) = (0;0;0;0;0). Hence
the core cover of v is given by:
CC(v) =
©
x 2 RN j x ¸ 0; x4 + x5 = 1; x1 = x2 = x3 = 0
ª
:
Because of symmetry, one does not need to calculate all marginal vec-
tors to compute the Weber set. There are only six marginal vectors each







We conclude that m¾
1 +m¾
2 +m¾
3 = ¡1 for all ¾ 2 Π(N). Hence m1 +m2 +
m3 = ¡1 for all m 2 W(v), and therefore CC(v) \ W(v) = ;.
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